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Hall: Wills--Rights of Adopted Children

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Wills-Rights of Adopted Children
T's will, executed in 1900, devised property in trust for the benefit of her granddaughter, A, for life, and if A should die leaving a
"child or children" surviving her, then to "such child or children",
or if she died without "issue" surviving her, to other specified remaindermen. T died in 1908, prior to A's adoption of X in 1931.
In 1965, A died survived only by X. Action was instituted by the
trustee under T's will to determine inheritance rights as between
X and the contingent remaindermen. The lower court held that X
was not, in law, the child or issue of A and took nothing under T's
will. Held, affirmed. "[A]n adopted child is not entitled to
property devised or bequeathed to the 'child', 'children', or 'issue' of
the adoptive parent unless a contrary intent is disclosed by the
will. . . ; and, this is especially so where the adoption occurs after
after the death of the testator, or even after the making of the will."
Security National Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 120
(W. Va. 1967).
In rendering its decision in the principal case, the court discussed the West Virginia statute in effect when the will was executed.'
This statute was considered in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust
Co. v. Stewart,2 in which the court held that the testator had not
intended to include adopted children in his will. The adoption
statute in effect at the time of the Stewart decision stated in effect
that an adopted child could not take property under a will limiting
the property expressly to the heirs of the body of the adopting
parent(s).' In 1959, subsequent to the Stewart decision, the legislature amended the adoption statute 4 seemingly indicating that an
adopted child was to be considered as the equal of a natural child
for all purposes. This major policy revision was contained in the
following language: "[T]he adopted child shall be, to all intents
and for all purposes, the child of the person or persons so adopting
him or her and shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges and
subject to all the obligations of a natural child of such adopting
parent or parents."' Again, in 1967, following the principal case,
the legislature amended the adoption statute by inserting the words
' W. VA. CODE ch. 122, § 4 (Barnes 1923). This is the forerunner to the

current adoption statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Michie Supp. 1967).
2 128 W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946).
3W. VA. CODE ch 122, § 4 (Barnes 1923).
4 W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Miehie 1966).
5

Id. (emphasis added).
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"legitimate issue" in lieu of "child" as italicized in the above quoted
portion.' At common law, 'lawful issue" or "legitimate issue" included those who were children of a legally recognized marriage.7
It would seem from these amendments that the West Virginia
Legislature is attempting to reflect a social policy advocating a
general presumption of adopted children being equal to natural
children in all respects, including the fact situation presented by the
principal case.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has made it clear
that wills containing ambiguous language will be construed by
determining the testators intent at the time of the will's execution.
The determining factor used in the construction of the intent of
the testator is the language expressed in the wills and codicils, with
consideration given to all surrounding circumstances.' This intent
must be ascertained by the will itself, when possible, and if the
general intent of the testator is expressed in the will without inconsistencies, every word will be given effect.9 But in case of
ambiguity in the testamentary language, statutes in effect when
the will was written which relate to descent, distribution, and adoption may be used as aids (not controlling factors) in determining
this intent."0
In the principal case the statute in effect when T's will was written, stating that an adopted child was not capable of inheriting
property limited expressly to the heirs of the body of the adopting
6

W. VA. COD ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Michie Supp. 1967).
re Sheffer's Will, 249 N.Y.S. 102, 105 (1931).
8 See, e.g., Mauzy v. Nelson, 147 W. Va. 764, 768, 131 S.E.2d 389, 39192 (1963); Claymore v. Wallace, 146 W. Va. 379, 386, 120 S.E.2d 241, 246
(1961); Wooddell v. Frye, 144 W. Va. 755, 759, 110 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1959);
Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 850, 105 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1958); Weiss v.
Soto, 142 W. Va. 783, 795, 98 S.E.2d 727, 736 (1957); Goetz v. Old Nat'l
Bank of Martinsburg, 140 W. Va. 422, 429, 84 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1954);
Harper v. Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co., 140 W. Va. 193, 198, 83 S.E.2d
522, 526 (1954); Ball v. Ball, 136 W. Va. 852, 859, 69 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1952);
Hunt v. Furman, 132 W. Va. 706, 710, 52 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1949); Stephenson
v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 612, 49 S.E.2d 235, 242 (1948); Wheeling Dollar
Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 706, 37 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1946);
v. e.g.,
Hedrick, 125 W. Va. 702, 706, 25 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1943).
Hedrick
9
See,
Claymore v. Wallace, 146 W. Va. 379, 389, 120 S.E.2d 241,
247 (1961); Wooddell v. Frye, 144 W. Va. 755, 759, 110 S.E.2d 916, 919
(1959); Weiss v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 783, 795, 98 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1956);
Goetz v. Bank of New Martinsburg, 140 W. Va. 422, 429-30, 84 S.E.2d 759,
766 (1954); Young v. Lewis, 138 W. Va. 425, 431, 76 S.E.2d 276, 280 (1953);
Ball v. Ball, 136 W. Va. 852, 859, 69 S.E.2d 55, 60 (1952); Dingess v.
Drake, 135 W. Va. 502, 508, 64 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1951); Bently v.
Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 646, 53 S.E. 636, 638 (1906); Graham v. Graham,
23 W.
10 Va. 36, 41 (1883); Hinton v. Millburn, 23 W. Va. 166, 177 (1883).
Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 119
(W. Va. 1967).
7In
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parent(s)," was considered influential by the court in determining
T's intent. In addition the court considered the case of Wheeling
Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Stewart'2 as "largely determinative
of a proper decision in the instant case."' 3 The Stewart case contained a fact situation similar to that in the principal case and the
court concluded that the testator had not intended to include adopted children in his will. In doing so, the court equated "descendant
and descendants" and "direct descendants" to natural children and
considered the terms similar to the word "issue". In the principal
case, the court construed the use of the words "child or children"
and "issue" as used in the will as being synonymous and stated that
it is generally held that the word "issue" refers to natural-born
children, excluding adopted children. Thus, by applying the statute
to the language of the will, the court felt that they could arrive
at no other conclusion than to exclude the adopted child.
In many states today, a legislative policy of treating adopted and
natural children as being equal can be found.' 4 In 1962, twentyfour state statutes expressly provided for inheritance through and
from the foster parents and ten others could be so construed.'"
Some states, where the statutes of descent and distribution provide
that adoptees may inherit through as well as from their adoptive
parents, have given great weight to this declaration of legislative
policy through decisions in their courts.' 6 Their courts have
considered it a declaration in favor of treating an adoptee as the
equal of a child born into the family for all purposes of succession,
and rules of construction reflecting this policy have been judicially
established.'7 In so doing, these courts have considered the policy
declared or implied in the legislation as justification for these
IIW. VA.

CODE ch. 122, § 4 (Barnes 1923).

12128 W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946).
13 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114, 117
(W. Va. 1967).
'4See, e.g., ALA.CODE tit. 27 § 5 (1958); CAL. PROB. C. A., § 257 (1959);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-4 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE, §14-11-13
(1960); WAsH. REV. CODE, § 26.32.140 (1961).
is Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IowA
L. REV. 974 n. 18 (1962). The author referred to REPORT OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON MODERNIZATION, SIMPLIFICATION AND REVISION OF TIIE
LAW OF ESTATES, REP. No. 1.2c, 148, 154-55 (1962).

16 Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 521-22, 319 P.2d 637, 642 (1957);
Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 181 (1957); First Nat'l Bank of

Kansas City v. Waldron, 406 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Mo. 1966); In re Estate of
Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 489, 201 A.2d 571, 574 (1964); Conville v. Bakke, 400
P.2d 179, 191 (Okla. 1965). Contra, Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 172 N.E.2d

1961); In re Trust of Miller, 133 Mont. 354, 323 P.2d 885
413, 420 (Ill.
(1958); Thomas v. Thomas, 258 N.C. 590, 129 S.E.2d 239 (1963).
'7 Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 521, 522, 319 P.2d 637, 642 (1957);

In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 489, 201 A.2d 571, 574 (1964).
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rules. 8 The social desirability of the adoptive child's complete
integration into his new family is recognized as great by many
writers. 9 However, a court's reluctance to establish a rule of
construction favorable to adoptees may be explained by a fear that
such a construction might be employed for purposes of financial
gain.2
The above discussion seems to indicate that West Virginia may
have a conflict between the legislature and judiciary which could
present problems in the future concerning the status of adopted
children as heirs. It appears to be the intent of the West Virginia
Legislature to impress upon the courts their feeling that public
policy demands that West Virginia fall in line with those states
treating adoptees as natural children for all intents and purposes,
including taking as a child or issue under a devise in a will.
However, the Supreme Court of West Virginia, though expressly
reserving decision as to the effect of the 1959 amendment to the
West Virginia adoption statute upon a will made after the effective
date of the amendment, stated by dictum without limitation by reference to the admendment, that an adopted child shall not take
under a devise to "children" or "issue" of the adoptive parent, unless
a contrary intent is shown. This appears to place the opinion of the
judicial branch of our state government in direct opposition to that
of the legislative branch. When the problem again arises under the
now existing 1967 amendment, the conflict between legislative intent and judicial precedent will hopefully be resolved.
However, the thorough and cautious attorney should always
determine the testator's wishes as to the consideration of any after
adopted children and provide for such when executing a will. By
this practice of preventive law, the problem as outlined above may
remain moot.
F. Richard Hall
181d.
19 See, e.g., Merrill and Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law,
40 IowA L. Rv. 299, 318-19 (1955); Kennedy, The Legal Effects of
Adoption,
33 CAN. B. REv. 751, 874-75 (1955).
20
.See, e.g., In Re Stanford's Estate, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681, 692
(1957). In this case, the court pointed out the possibility that by allowing

adopted children to take as natural children, the institution of adoption might

be used for self-advancement, fraud, or spite by using it to fullfill the requirement in a testator's will that the adoptor have children; Adrain v. Koch,
83 N.J. Eq. 484, 91 A. 123 (1914). In this case, the court discussed the
problem concerning a member of the family being adopted by another
member of the family. Where a statute allows adopted children to take under
a will as natural children, a problem of double shares could arise.
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